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Benjamin Disraeli And The Foundations Of
Western Posture In The Middle East
R.

J. Maras

To understand the appearance of Great Britain in the Middle East as well as the
resurgence of Egyptian nationalism requires an understanding of the political development and role of Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81), a key figure in forty-five years
(1830-75) in British politics and Anglo-French relations. His activities appear indispensably germane to the subject. Thus the political roots of Egypt's nationalistic
outburst in 1956 and after that brought it more self-determination and aggressive
leadership contain a pattern of growth that may be traced back 125 years amidst
the continuity of Franco-British relations. Thereupon it is concluded that the irony
-for example, the events of October, 1956-that oftentimes results from a policy
of self-interest was already inherent in the Egyptian situation of 1875 when England
and France became the Western partners in the management of the Suez Canal
Company.!
Disraeli returned to England from a grand tour of the eastern Mediterranean
region in 1831, the heyday of Romanticism. 2 Such a journey to a distant and
exotic land left permanent impressions upon the young man of twenty-seven, stirring his imagination and whetting a hunger for politics. Well do his biographers
describe the travel:
It not only enlarged his experience beyond that of most young Englishmen
of his day, but, what was even more important to one of his peculiar temperament, it helped to give definite purpose and significance to the
Oriental tendency in his nature, which, vaguely present before, was henceforth to dominate his imagination and show itself in nearly all his achievements ... but we can see it not less clearly in the bold stroke of policy
which laid the foundations of English ascendancy in Egypt, in the act
which gave explicit form to the conception of an Indian Empire with the
Sovereign of Great Britain at its head, and in the settlement imposed on
Europe at the Berlin Congress.3
While politically a novice, Disraeli already considered the serious nature of
foreign policy in his novel, Gallomania (1832):
There is no subject on which, as a society, we are so misinformed as our
foreign policy ... To my mind it is of primary, of paramount importance :
upon our foreign policy the safety as well as the glory of this country as a
great Empire depends. 4
His early political views were neither Whig nor Tory, even though he resided
in Edmund Burke's old locality of Beaconsfield and eventually rejuvenated the
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decadent Conservative Party. During this period of surging nationalism it was
natural for Disraeli to claim that his politics could be described by one word:
England. As a candidate of the English Radicals, he stumped for election to Parliament, October, 1832. One of his addresses irritated both major political parties,
but it was ineptitude of Whig foreign policy that he deplored because it might
have led to the loss of British supremacy on the seas. s Disraeli cherished the
cardinal point of British politics that domestic and foreign policy cannot be disassociated.
The first thorny problem with which Disraeli grappled was the age-old Near
Eastern Question, a problem for which his visit to the Levant and meeting with
Pasha Mehemet Ali prepared him to speak with conviction and understanding.
On May 25, 1838, Ali renewed his bold actions to free himself and Egypt from the
Ottoman yoke, but the occasion almost precipitated hostilities between France,
supporting Ali, and England, Austria, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, the suzerain
State. Actually, Palmerston and Thiers, the foreign ministers, were forced to resign
and Aberdeen and Guizot, who sought to restore amity, replaced them in 1841.
Disraeli appeared very eager to encourage goodwill;6 but he reserved judgment on
the issue, being divided in sentiment between a friend, King Louis Philippe, and
his homeland, England. 7 The crisis expired when France withdrew her support of
Ali, who, while surrendering Syria, became practically independent of the Ottoman
Empire as "hereditary governor" of Egypt. 8 The Great Powers in signing the Straits
Convention of July 13, 1841, ushered in an era of peace.
Contemporaneously in England, Sir Robert Peel was elected to his second prime
ministry (September, 1841-June, 1846) with a conservative majority of ninety members in the House of Commons. Disraeli believed that a political party could "dictate the character of his (Peel's) foreign policy." He declared-rather prophetically
in the light of the events of October, 1956-that "in the international union of
France and England depend not merely the material prosperity but ultimately
their existence as powers of the first class." To support an Anglo-French alliance,
Disraeli planned to found a press organization.9 In December, 1845, on a visit to
Paris, he observed that King Louis Philippe and Guizot, his chief minister, were
perplexed by the change (perhaps in regard to the issue of the Spanish marriages)
in the English government. With Palmerston's return highly probable, Disraeli
strove to assure them that Palmers ton was the first British foreign minister who
had taken the friendship of France, as "an avowed element of our national policy."
But Louis Philippe and Guizot remained skeptical. Upon his return to England,
Disraeli urged Palmerston to visit France and the following year, during the Easter
holidays , Palmers ton arrived in Paris. Before departure, " ce terrible Lord Palmerston" became "ce cher Lord Palmerston."lo However, the apparent reconciliation
was short-lived since the untoward incident of the Spanish marriages emerged and
betrayed the hope of all concerned. l1
At this juncture of circumstances, an event occurred that went far to cement
friendly relations between England and France. In March, 1848, the Federal Diet
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of the German Confederation "called upon the German Governments" to prevent
Denmark from possessing the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.12 Under the guise
of the principle of nationality, Prussia eventually (1864-66) aggrandized itself
there, but in 1848, despite hostilities, the Prussians were unable to acquire the
territory because of the warning from Great Britain, France, and Russia. Keenly
aware of the strategic value of the Danish sounds and Lowlands, Disraeli remarked
that if Prussia had obtained harbors to the north, the threat to England and to the
maintenance of peace would be serious; moreover, he hoped that Prussian aims
in the strategic region would not go unnoticed and "uncensored."13 Thus the
German provocation so strengthened the bond of mutual regard between England
and France, that even the revolutionary events from November, 1848, in France
could not divide the two powers.
The Revolution of February, 1848, liquidated the parliamentary monarchy of
Louis Philippe, forced him into exile in England, and the succeeding provisional
government called for national elections (Autumn, 1848) based on universal suffrage. Louis Napoleon won an overwhelming victory in that election to become
President of the Second French Republic. British official circles received this news
favorably but, on the other hand, the British press, remembering the struggle for
survival with Napoleon Bonaparte a generation ago, opposed the political upheaval
and the change of government. 14 From Paris, Lord Stanley dispatched a letter to
Disraeli stating that Louis Napoleon received him very kindly as the British
ambassador.IS Disraeli, the Conservative leader in the House of Commons, continued to regard Louis Philippe as the King of France even after his overthrow and
the establishment of residence in England. 16
Three years later, December 2, 1851, when Louis Napoleon extended unilaterally
his presidential term from four to ten years, Palmerston quickly approved the coup,
but Lord John Russell, the prime minister, disliked the foreign minister's sanction
and dismissed him. A month elapsed when another cabinet crisis ensued. In the
upshot, the Conservative Party attained political leadership. Lord Stanley (14th
Earl of Derby) became prime minister (Feb. 27-Dec. 18) and Disraeli accepted his
first cabinet post, that of chancellor of the exchequer while retaining his role of
Conservative leader in the House of Commons.17 It was this British government
that quickly recognized the new imperial regime in France. Louis Napoleon was
convinced that uncle Bonaparte's deadly mistake was his deeply engrained hatred
of the British, and to obtain diplomatic recognition from Great Britain, Louis
promised not to change the European balance of power-a quid pro quo arrangement. England was the first state to recognize him. 18 For his part, Disraeli desired
a commercial treaty with France to popularize his budget statement, as well as to
strengthen the bonds of Anglo-French amity. Attainment of these objectives seemed
likely for reasons previously stated as well as the fact that Lord Malmesbury, the
British ambassador to the Quai d'Orsay, was a confidant of Louis Napoleon. 19
Shortly after and despite the proclamation of the Second French Empire on
December 2, 1852, which restored the persistent memory of Bonaparte and implied
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an aggressive foreign policy, Disraeli strove for a resumption cif close association
with France. On February 18, 1853, while clarifying his position and impugning
the foreign policy of Lord Aberdeen, Disraeli declared that cordial relations should
be the keynote of British foreign policy.2o From France, (March, 1853), Malmesbury,
whose confidence in the peaceful intentions of the emperor remained steadfast,
informed Disraeli that Napoleon III desired an English alliance and the consolidation of "his position with the Great Powers by a pacific policy." Nevertheless,
Queen Victoria deemed it necessary to look after the country's defenses even
though no serious French threat seemed near.21 Instead, the Near Eastern question
erupted once more.
A serious rupture in the European Concert of 1815 emerged from the religious
discord between the Orthodox Christians and those subject to Roman authority
in the Ottoman Empire. The Russians, long regarding themselves as overseers of
the "Christian religion and churches" since the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, [July
26, 1774), demonstrated the will to protect their co-religionists. 22 France showed
interest because of its traditional protection of Christians in the Near East since
the Capitulations Agreement of 1535. In England, Disraeli led a policy of opposition
to Russia, for if she acquired Constantinople Russian influence would overthrow
European civilization and undermine the interests of England. 23 As early as 1844
both Russia and England may have come to a "verbal", secret understanding about
the possibility of a partition of the Ottoman territory, and in 1853 the Tsar, having
been denied what seemed to him a foregone conclusion, unilaterally ordered his
armies across the River Pruth.24 On March 28, 1854, England and France declared
war on Russia.
The Crimean war years confused political and diplomatic affairs in England. Lord
Aberdeen's coalition government, (1852-55), negotiated a military convention with
Austria on December 2, 1854. But Disraeli showed little faith in the Austrian
alliance which vaguely bound Austria to oppose Russia "in certain eventualities
in the future." Subsequently, because of public opinion and the motion of the
radical Roebuck for an investigation of the war, an action which Disraeli also
approved, the Aberdeen government fell and Palmers ton accepted the prime
ministry.2s In the successive weeks of March, 1855, Disraeli launched a peace
offensive in his weekly newspaper, the Press. Tsar Nicholas I died on March 2,
1855, and his son and successor, Alexander II, was disposed to peace negotiations.
In mid-April, Napoleon Ill's state visit to England buoyed Disraeli's hopes for
peace.
In the deliberations as to a basis of peace at the Vienna conference, Russia
recoiled from the crucial third point, regarding naval bases on the Black Sea. On
May 26, Disraeli's volte face demanded prosecution of the war for the peace negotiations had become a farce: 'Our part is taken, our terms are known, we have
confidence in the justice of our cause and the might of our arms, and we dare
the last dread issue . .. the appeal to battle.'26 Thus fighting continued.
On September 8 Sebastopol, the Crimean fortress, fell to the western powers
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and the time was opportune for Disraeli to launch a second peace offensivefor he believed that the ob jective of war, the defense of the existing Ottoman
Empire, had been secured. He received support from Napoleon III while Palmerston's "war party" clamored for continuation of the war.27 On February 1, 1856,
after the modification of Point Three regarding the Black Sea in the protocol of
the peace of Vienna, Russia acceded to the terms which neutralized the Black Sea
area. The resolution was incorporated in the definitive Treaty of Paris, March
30,1856. 28

The following fifteen years, 1856-71 , were crucial for Great Britain. Pursuing a
policy of splendid isolation which aimed at the preservation of peace and the
balance of power in Europe, England actually was short-sighted as the rise of
Italy and of Germany to statehood upset the old structure of the European nationstates system. At the opening of the Italian Wars of Liberation, Disraeli advocated
peace. In the Polish Revolution of 1863 he urged non-intervention for no "sufficient
interests" were involved. 29 Later Disraeli recalled: "I think the climax of mismanagement was reached in the conduct of the Government with respect to the
Polish insurrection and its diplomatic communications on that subject, both with
France and Russia."3o At the time of the Schleswig-Holstein aggrandizement by
Prussia and Austria in 1864, he opposed the war, but supported England's presence
in Europe "in accordance with the laws of nations and with the stipulations of
treaties. 3l Twelve years earlier the Derby-Disraeli government had negotiated the
London agreement which ratified but did not guarantee the duchies to the Danish
king. When Napoleon III declined to intervene in behalf of Denmark and the
duchies fell to Austria and Prussia, Disraeli's distrust of him naturally arose .
Campaigning for reelection in 1866, Disraeli reinterpreted England's position as no
longer just another European power, but the heart of "a great maritime empire."32
Finally, the revolutionary consequences of the Austro-Prussian war (1866) were not
at once understood by Disraeli, even though the turn of events shifted the strength
in west-central Europe in favor of the North German (Prussian) Confederation. A
letter of July 31, 1867, to General Grey, Queen Victoria's private secretary, presents
Disraeli's views on Prussia and, indirectly, France: "I think the general bias of
Lord Stanley'S mind is to lean toward Prussia, and I have always encouraged and
enforced that tendency."33
When Lord Stanley resigned as prime minister in 1868, Disraeli succeeded to that
office from March to November. His policy, he declared, would be the pursuit of
peace without selfish isolation. Several months later, (June, 1868), in an address
at Merchant Taylors' Hall Disraeli praised his success: " ... there never existed
between England and foreign powers a feeling of greater cordiality and confidence
than now prevails." At the time of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71, Disraeli
joined with English public opinion to blame Louis Napoleon III and French impetuosity for the war. He also sensed that there had been a greater "natural affinity"
between Great Britain and Germany ; the events of July, he added, confirmed his
view. He advocated a neutral course-an "armed neutrality," perhaps with Russia's
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cooperation. After the "blitz" -like war, Disraeli recoiled. He was apprehensive for
the new German Empire appeared to have definitely upset the old balance of
power system. 34 In this sense the war of 1870-71 was a major turning point.
Disraeli's election as prime minister, 1874-80, marks the end of an isolationist
era for Britain-an era wherein the rise of Germany and Italy necessitated a
reorientation of British foreign policy. In an address to his electors, Disraeli
censured the old government "for showing too little energy in Foreign Affairs,
and too much in domestic legislation. That order of things it was his intention to
revise." Anxious that Great Britain's influence should again be significant in
Europe, "he was determined to win for his country the place in continental politics
which Germany under Bismark was usurping."35 Upset by the political and territorial changes in central Europe, Disraeli could state: " ... It is curious, but since
the fall of France who used to give us so much trouble, the conduct of foreign
affairs for England has become infinitely more difficult ... ".36 Again, in a pessimistic letter ot Lord Derby, he wrote that England " ... shall be kept in a state
of unrest for a long time; probably until the beginning of the next Thirty Years'
War."3? While Disraeli's alarms increased during the War Scare of March, 13-May
10, 1875, he helped to preserve peace through Lord Lyons, the British ambassador
to France. 38 Everyone desired peace, but the real significance of this event lay in
England's departure from isolation, a move substantiated by the purchase of stock
in the Suez Canal Company.
In the diplomatic history of the late nineteenth century, Disraeli's acquisition of
the Suez Stock rivals in diplomatic dexterity such faits accomplis as the Ems
telegram of 1870 and Austria 's possession of Bosnia-Herzegovia in 1908. It seems
that the diplomats of the nineteenth century improved on the predecessors of the
eighteenth century in the matter of calculation, swiftness, finality and hardness
of conscience. Of these countries, only Britain retained her prize beyond 1918.
In the pre-Canal era, Palmers ton balked at British participation in the canal project,
and Disraeli disliked Ferdinand de Lesseps' undertaking because of its "engineering
impracticability."39
From 1869-74 Lesseps, the engineer of the Suez Canal. was unable to show a
profit from its business activity. After the opening of the Canal to traffic, more
than three-fourths of the shipping that passed through it was British. The Canal
shortened the previous journey from London to Bombay, India-where British
investments were heavy-by approximately 4400 miles. 4o To offset financial difficulties, Lesseps raised the tonnage duties but Ismail Pasha, the impecunious
Egyptian khedive, thwarted this policy. Neither was to have complete control.
As early as April, 1874, Lord Derby knew of Lesseps' embarrassment and the
Canal's condition. Thereupon he wrote to Disraeli: 'We cannot let the Canal go to
ruin; it is too useful for US.'41 Taking advantage of this "golden opportunity" Disraeli, with vigorous persistence, acquired the Canal stock. 42 Queen Victoria approved the action and the cabinet presented him a carte blanche. On the other
hand, Louis Charles Elie Decazes (1819-86), foreign minister of the Third French
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Republic, was not too anxious to estrange a British government which supported
France during the recent War Scare (1875) with Germany. Decazes instructed
Gavard, charge d'affaires in London, to discuss the Canal situation with Lord Derby.
Suddenly, French attempts to acquire the stock halted, French fin anciers were
unable to raise the necessary money, and the bankrupt khedive offered the stock
to the British government (Le. Disraeli}.43
The reactions to Disraeli's diplomatic success were mixed. He, himself, championed a "Dual Control" policy in Egypt and resisted all suggestions of eliminating
France from the Suez. France had to be respected. 44 Queen Victoria, whose support
had been of great help, greeted the event as "a blow at Bismark." Yet no one gloated
more than the Iron Chancellor, for his European policy remained intact and there
loomed a likelihood of Anglo-French friction in Egypt. 45 Disraeli sent word to
Lady Bradford (November 25 , 1875): "The Fairy (Queen Victoria) is in ecstacies
about 'this great and important event'-wants 'to know all about it when Mr. D.
(Disraeli) comes down today.' The following day Queen Victoria wrote to Mr.
Theodore Martin: "It is entirely the doing of Mr. Disraeli who has very large ideas
and very lofty views (sic) of the position this country should have."46 Britain's
Sllccess in the Suez region was a turning point in universal history .
. For more than four centuries, or since the days of Cardinal Wolsey, England has
pursued a policy of balance of power in European politics. Disraeli added an
indispensable corollary when the Suez Canal became the strategic link in the
economic life-line stretching from London to India and the Far East. This corollary
or principle can aptly be described by the phrase "hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean." Previously, between 1866-70, Germany and Italy overturned the traditional balance of nations on the European continent. This fact England failed to
realize in its importance and implications until the defeat of France in 1870-71.
Yet, by a sudden and phenomenal rise to power, the German empire unwittingly
assisted the rapprochement of France and England, and this mutual attraction was
confirmed by the events of 1875, the Congress of Berlin in 1878, and definitively
by the entente cordiale of 1904. After 1875 the Ottoman empire (later Turkey),
bordering Russia, received unprecedented strategic significance as a bulwark confronting Russia. So long as her political integrity remained , English interests were
secure in the eastern Mediterranean. Additional protection Disraeli provided in
1878 by acquiring Cyprus. 47 However, in 1956-57, the position of Egypt-mutatis
mutandi and no longer under the Turkish or British yoke and having nationalized
the Canal-posed a grave problem and serious threat to Western hegemony there .48
The concerted attack on Egypt by France and England in October, 1956-coming
on the heels of nationalization and the Israeli-Egyptian War-whatever the avowed
motivations for their action, was a logical, historical development in Franco-British
relations since 1830.49 Bitter irony appears in their ouster from Egypt at the insistence of the United Nations, including the United States.
It is not by singular reference to the events since World War II that one can
fully understand the contemporary events in the Middle East. Actually that is only
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one part, albeit a large one, of the history. Whereas an analysis of the immediate
causes leading to the Egyptian problems leaves many questions unanswered, a
study of the historical background from 1830-75 and after clarifies the positions
of France and England to date; it likewise clarifies the position taken in recent
years by Egypt, the Soviet Union, and certainly the United States which has replaced Great Britain as a principal guarantor of peace there. Strategic reasons
as well as considerations of oil, nationalism, and history have contributed to the
tensions and periodic crises. It was Disraeli who welded Great Britain into the
living mosaic. With the decline of British power, the United States has stepped
into the breach to uphold Western posture in the Middle East (and Europe).
University of Dayton
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